I'm a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Toronto. In my research, I focus mostly on the philosophy of action and ethics, but I also work a lot on issues in business ethics, specifically on issues at the intersection of business ethics and technology. I have further interests in political philosophy, early modern philosophy, and in the philosophy of mind.
I grew up in Israel, and came to Toronto after receiving my BA in PPE (Philosophy, Politics, Economics) and MA in Philosophy, both from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Dissertation: Responsibility for the Self
In my dissertation, I argue that we are answerable for our commitments - those attitudes that are central to who we are - in virtue of having the ability to reason. I criticize two competing views: "voluntarism, according to which commitments are voluntary and therefore responsibility for them requires voluntary control; and "reflectionism", which maintains that responsibility for commitments requires a capacity for higher-order reflection.
Forthcoming, Business Ethics Quarterly.
In the future, firms may be able to use big-data analysis to discover and offer consumers their individual reservation price (i.e. the highest price each consumer would be willing to pay, given their preferences and available income). I offer an improvement to the market-failures approach and argue that big-data personalized pricing is wrong because it unfairly undermines consumers’ ability to benefit from the market, which is the very point of having a market.
2017, Business Ethics Journal Review 5(5) 28-34
According to the Market-Failures approach, ethical behavior on the part of management consists in abstaining from profit-maximizing strategies which, under conditions of perfect competition, would decrease Pareto-efficiency. However, since (1) such conditions do not obtain; and (2) the most efficient result – under imperfect conditions – is not achieved by satisfying the largest possible set of the remaining conditions; it is (3) impossible to draw any substantive ethical guidelines from this approach.
Reflection and Responsibility for Attitudes
According to what I call 'Reflectionism', the capacity for higher-order reflection on one's attitudes and mental states is necessary for being answerable for these attitudes. I argue that if we understand this claim as a claim about the epistemic conditions for answerability for attitudes, then Reflectionism is false for the case of answerability for attitudes. It is possible to be answerable for an attitude without having epistemic access to the fact of having it. If there is an epistemic condition for answerability for attitudes, then it is that one must have epistemic access to the reasons for one’s attitudes, rather than epistemic access to the fact of having these attitudes.
A few words
[Full statement: coming soon]
Under construction (hard hat required)
As course instructor
University of Toronto
2019 - Business Ethics (2nd year course)
2017 - Intro to Ethics (2nd year course)
2015 - Ethics: Problems of the Self (3rd year course)
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
2015 / 2016 - Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science (for non-philosophers)
2015 - Business Ethics (for business students)
As writing instructor
University of Toronto
2018-19 Lead Writing Teaching Assistant, Philosophy.
Position included continuous pedagogical training; designing, coordinating and running workshops for teaching assistants to help them teach writing more effectively; and providing feedback to course instructors on their course- and assignment- design.
2018-19 Essay Clinician, Philosophy.
Position included meeting with students in all philosophy courses, one-on-one, and providing them with constructive feedback on their essays-in-progress to improve their writing skills.
How to say my name
The spelling of my name has misled many in their attempts to pronounce it.
For your convenience, here's a quick guide for pronouncing my name:
Begin with the word email
Substitute 'tie' for 'mail' (you now have e-tie)
Emphasize the 'tie' instead of the 'e' (e-TIE)
And there you go!